Soon after the start of science operations of the Chandra X-ray Observatory, it became apparent that weakly penetrating (0.1-0.5 MeV) protons in the Earth's radiation belt were causing an unexpectedly rapid increase in the charge-transfer inefficiency of Chandra's front-illuminated CCDs. Fortunately, the Chandra team developed, implemented, and maintains a radiation-protection program that successfully reduced the rate of degradation of the CCDs' performance to acceptable levels. Since implementing this program, the average rate of increase of the charge-transfer inefficiency has slowed to 3.2×10 -6 /y (2.3%/y) for the front-illuminated CCDs and 1.0×10 -6 /y (5.8%/y) for the back-illuminated CCDs. This paper reviews the Chandra radiation-management program, reports the current status, and describes changes planned or implemented since the previous paper on this topic.
INTRODUCTION
The Chandra X-ray Observatory 1, 2, 3 has now completed 8 years of science operations, providing unprecedented subarcsecond x-ray imaging, imaging spectrometry, and high-resolution dispersive spectroscopy. During the first several orbits after first light, some of the CCDs-namely, all the front-illuminated devices-suffered a rapid increase in charge-transfer inefficiency (CTI), which threatened the scientific utility of these CCDs. Happily, the Chandra team identified the cause of this degradation, adopted operational procedures to halt the rapid radiation damage, and developed a radiation-management program 4, 5 (Papers I and II) to limit further degradation to satisfactory levels.
Here we first briefly review the "CTI anomaly" ( §1.1) and the Chandra radiation-management program ( §1.2), which Papers I and II describe in detail. Next we report the status ( §2) of that program and describe recent enhancements ( §3).
ACIS CTI anomaly
The Chandra X-ray Observatory provides two focal-plane instruments-the (microchannel-plate) High-Resolution Camera 6 (HRC) and the Advanced CCD Imaging Spectrometer 7 (ACIS)-each with an imaging (I) array and with a spectroscopy (S) array. ACIS-I is a 2×2 CCD array; ACIS-S, a 6×1 array of which 2 CCDs are back-illuminated (BI).
During initial science operations, the charge-transfer inefficiency (CTI) of the 8 front-illuminated (FI) CCDs increased rapidly. 8 On the other hand, the CTI of BI CCDs did not increase nor did the dark current in either device, showing that weakly penetrating radiation caused the damage in the shallow charge-transfer channel of the FI devices. 9 This unanticipated damage resulted from relatively low-energy (0.1-0.5-MeV) protons 10 that scattered off Chandra's x-ray mirrors 11 during the 8 radiation-belt passages that the ACIS had been in the focal position.
Radiation protection
Upon recognizing this problem, the Chandra team modified operating procedures to translate the ACIS from the focal position (and ramp down the HRC high voltage) during each radiation-belt transit and during space-weather events. A three-prong radiation-protection program 4, 5 (Papers I and II) implements this policy, which has successfully limited further radiation damage to levels that readily support a mission of at least 15 years.
Scheduled protection
Chandra's on-board computer (OBC) executes all science observations and other scheduled operations using a nominal one-week command load and downloads science data typically 3 times a day. Each load safes the focal-plane instruments against radiation damage before radiation-zone ingress and resumes science observations upon egress. The times for stopping and resuming science operations follow from the standard AP8/AE8 environment, with a nominal 10-ks pad against variations in the boundaries of the radiation zones-particularly the outer electron zone.
While scheduled protection precludes a rapid increase in FI-CCD CTI during proton-belt transits, space-weather events-solar radiation storms, solar-wind shocks, and geomagnetic storms-could noticeably degrade the CCD performance over time. Consequently, the Chandra team developed and implemented additional steps ( §1.2.2 and §1.2.2) to budget exposure of the ACIS during such events.
Autonomous protection
Chandra employs the Electron, Proton, Helium Instrument 12 (EPHIN) as an on-board radiation monitor to protect autonomously the focal-plane instruments against radiation damage. The process "RADMON" runs on the OBC, sampling and evaluating 3 (of 13) EPHIN channels-P4 (4.3-7.8-MeV proton), P41 (41-53-MeV proton), and E1300 (2.6-6.2-MeV electron)-for autonomous radiation monitoring. When the count rate in any of the 3 monitored channels exceeds its respective threshold for a specified number (first 3, 10 since 2003 September 02) of consecutive 65.6-s samples, the OBC autonomously activates the radiation-protection stored command sequence (SCS107).
However, the EPHIN does not monitor the weakly penetrating radiation that produced the early damage to the FI CCDs. Hence, the third prong of the radiation-protection program involves the use of near-real-time space-weather data to facilitate an informed decision whether to intervene manually ( §1.2.3).
Manual intervention
The Chandra team implemented and maintains an extensive monitoring program using near-real-time data from other spacecraft, available primarily through the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Space Environment Center (SEC). The (geostationary) GOES proton monitor and the (L1) Advanced Composition Explorer 13 (ACE) Solar Isotope Spectrometer 14 (SIS) measure protons more energetic than several MeV and thus serve as surrogates for the EPHIN radiation monitor ( §1.2.2) between communications with the Chandra X-ray Observatory. In addition, the science operations team retrieves near-real-time data from ESA's XMM-Newton radiation monitor, which measures protons as low as 1 MeV and is in a high elliptical orbit similar to that of Chandra.
However, the ACE Electron, Proton, and Alpha Monitor 15 (EPAM) provides the most relevant near-real-time data-the low-energy (0.05-2-MeV) proton spectrum in the solar wind. To supplement these data, MSFC's space environments group developed the Chandra Radiation Model 16 (CRM), which employs ACE data to estimate the 0.14-MeV-proton spectral intensity throughout Chandra's orbit-(1) solar wind, (2) magnetosheath, and (3) magnetosphere. The Chandra team tracks the 0.14-MeV-proton orbital fluence measured by the ACE EPAM in the solar wind and estimated by the real-time CRM elsewhere, and issues an alert (via pager and e-mail) if the 2-hour fluence exceeds a specified value. Based upon automated alerts or upon concerns of personnel, the team meets via teleconference to decide whether to activate the radiation-protection stored command sequence (SCS107) at the next scheduled contact.
No plausible solar-energetic-proton event exhibits a 0.14-MeV-proton fluence rivaling that of a single unprotected radiation-belt transit. Thus, the purpose of manually intervening is to budget the long-term radiation damage.
STATUS
Here we discuss the evolution of Chandra's orbit and external trapped-proton fluence ( §2.1), provide an archive of radiation-protection events ( §2.2), and report measurements of the slowly increasing charge-transfer inefficiency CTI of the ACIS CCDs ( §2.3).
Orbit and trapped-proton fluence
Due to lunar perturbations, Chandra's high elliptical orbit-63.5-h period and 80.8-Mm (12.7-R ⊕ ) semi-major axisevolves markedly with a quasi-sinusoidal period of about 11.5 years. In 8 years of operation, Chandra's orbital eccentricity and inclination changed from 0.800 and 28.5° to 0.632 and 62.2°, respectively. Therefore, Chandra's apogee and perigee altitudes changed from 139 Mm and 10 Mm (22.8 R ⊕ and 2.5 R ⊕ , geocentric) to 125 Mm and 23 Mm (20.7 R ⊕ and 4.7 R ⊕ , geocentric), respectively. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the orbit's inclination and apogee and perigee altitudes over 25 years. At 6 years into the mission, the perigee was near a maximum, thus minimizing external exposure to trapped protons. Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of the trapped-proton (external) orbital fluence, computed using the SPace ENVironment Information System 17 (SPENVIS) tool to propagate Chandra's orbit through the standard AP8 radiation environment. If ACIS were left in the focal position during perigee passes, the rate of radiation damage due to weakly penetrating (0.1-0.5 MeV) trapped protons would vary by about 2 orders of magnitude over this period. However, ACIS will never again be exposed to trapped protons during a perigee pass, in that the command load always removes the ACIS from focal position by about 70-Mm altitude (12 R ⊕ geocentric). Having eliminated damage by the (weakly penetrating) trapped protons that caused the initial damage to the front-illuminated CCDs, the remaining contributors to increasing CTI ( §2.3) are weakly penetrating radiation scattered of the mirrors when ACIS is in the focal position and strongly penetrating radiation (solar energetic protons and cosmic rays) sufficiently energetic to pass through the shielding. Table 1 and Figure 3 identify the 64 radiation-protection (SCS 107) events that occurred during the first 8 years of Chandra operations. Of these, 20 manually commanded (M) SCS107s resulted in 1911-ks of lost science time; 44 autonomously activated (A) SCS107s, in 5240-ks of lost science time. Most SCS107 triggers were due to solarenergetic-particle (SEP) events accompanying major solar flares. Several autonomous SCS107 triggers happened just before scheduled radiation-zone protection ( §1.2.1), due to electron-flux spikes that present no danger to the instruments. However, such events lost little science time because the Chandra team restarted science operations upon radiation-zone egress. Further, increasing the number of consecutive above-threshold samples to trigger SCS107 from 3 to 10 has reduced the frequency of such events. A few other autonomous SCS107 triggers occurred immediately after re-enabling the RADMON process, due to a single above-threshold sample (either real or stale data) triggering SCS107 before the above-threshold counter had cleared from the previous radiation event. Modifying the re-start procedure eliminated these false triggers. 
Radiation-protection events

Charge-transfer inefficiency (CTI)
The radiation-protection program ( §1.2) has limited the rate of CTI increase to levels sufficiently small to allow ACIS to provide spectrometric imaging 18 for decades. Figure 4 shows the (parallel-transfer) CTI since 2000 January, after cooling the ACIS focal plane to its current operating temperature (-120°C), as determined by the ACIS team at MIT. These CTI measurements use the ACIS (Fe 55 ) external calibration source (ECS) that ACIS views in its stowed (NIL) position, and are corrected for cosmic-ray sacrificial charge 19 . CXC data processing now includes a CTI correctororiginally developed by the ACIS team 20, 21 -that removes the non-stochastic position-dependent gain error due to CTI. As the ACIS team has noted 22, 23 , the observed dependence of CTI upon inherent device shielding and focal-plane temperature show that the current radiation damage is caused by a harder proton spectrum than the initial damage during the unprotected radiation-belt transits. Table 2 shows the 2000-Jan CTI and subsequent average rate of CTI increase for various locations of the charge-transfer (CT) channel, along with the intrinsic CCD shielding of the respective CT channel and its cutoff energy for penetration by protons. In that 2.5-mm aluminum covers the framestore of each CCD, damage to this area cannot result from weakly penetrating radiation. Indeed, the approximate equality of the CTI increase in the (exposed) parallel and framestore areas of the BI CCD suggests that nearly all the damage to the BI devices results from strongly penetrating radiation-protons more energetic than 20 MeV (minimum lower bound). In contrast, weakly penetrating radiation-protons with energies >0.1 MeV but <2 MeV (maximum upper bound)-accounts for 70-80% of the current rate of the (exposed) parallel CTI increase in the FI CCDs. From Table 2 and the proton spectrum outside the radiation belts, we conclude that weakly penetrating protons (0.1-0.5 MeV) scattering off the telescope's mirrors currently produce about 75% of the damage to the FI CCDs and essentially none of the damage to the BI CCDs. This is the mechanism that effected the rapid FI-CCD CTI increase during the unprotected radiation-belt transits ( §1.1) and which the radiation-protection program ( §1.2) strives to limit. In contrast, nearly all the damage to the BI devices and about 25% of that to the FI CCDs results from strongly penetrating radiation, which does not efficiently scatter off the mirrors but does pass through structure and shielding provided by the Observatory. As Figure 5 illustrates, ACIS is essentially totally shielded to a mass column of 1 g/cm 2 when in the focal position and 2 g/cm 2 when in a NIL position, corresponding to cutoff energies E p ≈ 28 MeV and 40 MeV, respectively. Crudely accounting for energy dependences of the external proton spectrum, the (displacementdamage) nuclear stopping power, and the fractional shielding ( Figure 5 ), we estimate that the typical energy of strongly penetrating protons producing radiation damage is of 50-150 MeV (mass columns 3-20 g/cm 2 ). This is the type of damage for which the Observatory's shielding was designed and the resulting CTI increase from it is as expected. Of course, the radiation-protection program cannot reduce the damage due to the strongly penetrating radiation. 
ENHANCEMENTS
As described in Paper II 5 , the Chandra team has introduced several enhancements to the radiation-protection program. Here we provide updated information on the Chandra Radiation Model (CRM, §3.1), radiation-zone pad times ( §3.2), and thermally induced impacts on the EPHIN radiation monitor ( §3.3).
Chandra radiation model
The Chandra Radiation Model 16 (CRM) provides a 3-dimensional map of the 0.14-MeV-proton spectral intensity ( Figure 6 ). We derived the CRM by correlating archival data-from the Geotail Energetic Proton and Ion Composition (EPIC) detector 24 and from the Polar Comprehensive Energetic-Particle Pitch Angle Distribution (CEPPAD) instrument 25 -with the geomagnetic planetary index Kp and employing field-line mapping to populate fully the data cube throughout the domain of geocentric radii 8-32 R ⊕ . As reported in Paper II 5 , we updated the CRM to include Geotail EPIC and Polar CEPPAD data through 2004, thus substantially increasing data coverage-especially for highKp periods. Figure 6 illustrates the updated CRM for Kp = 1 (quiet), 3 (moderate), 5 (minor storm), and 7 (strong storm). The CRM demarcates three distinct radiation regions-(1) solar wind, (2) magnetopause, and (3) magnetosphere, separated by the bow shock and by the magnetopause, respectively. We utilize the Kp-correlated CRM for near-real-time estimation using the SEC-provided (neural-net) Costello Kp estimator 26 that is driven by real-time ACE Solar-Wind Electron Proton Alpha Monitor 27 (SWEPAM) data 28 . For an assumed value of Kp, we can also predict the fluence through the rest of an orbit to help decide whether to intervene ( §1.2.2) by manually commanding radiation protection (SCS107) at the next contact.
When Chandra is in the solar wind, the ACE EPAM P3 channel provides a direct measurement of the 0.14-MeV-proton spectral intensity. Outside the solar wind, we currently employ a conservative approach that combines real-time EPAM data and the near-real-time SWEPAM-Kp-driven CRM estimate:
Thus far, we have not implemented the updated CRM database, pending an evaluation of potential modifications to the above weighting scheme for combining EPAM measurements and CRM estimates of the proton intensity in the magnetosheath and in the magnetosphere. Also, the current solar minimum has provided a welcome respite from radiation events. However, this will change with the impending onset of the next solar cycle.
Radiation-zone pad times
Another application of the CRM has been to help reduce the nominal 10-ks pad times applied to the AE8/AP8 predictions for the radiation-zone boundaries, for scheduling radiation protection ( §1.2.1). As reported in Paper II 5 , mission planners now schedule radiation protection for perigee passes using radiation-zone pad times derived from a combined analysis 29, 30 of archival EPHIN and mean-CRM data. Since implementing this optimization of the radiationzone pad times on 2004 March 08, mission planners have recovered 710 ks for Chandra science observations. 
EPHIN thermal degradation
As described in Paper II 5 , degradation of Chandra's multilayer insulation (MLI) complicates thermal control of a few subsystems, including the EPHIN (1.2.2). Designed to monitor solar energetic particles, EPHIN is unshaded during normal operations, making its temperature particularly sensitive to the MLI's increasing solar absorptance. Limiting sun angles to reduce solar illumination of EPHIN has increasingly constrained operations. After considering potential EPHIN failure modes, their consequences, and the absence of any evidence for permanent degradation when operating EPHIN above its design temperature, the Chandra team has decided not to keep the EPHIN temperature limit as a firm constraint. Here we briefly describe the EPHIN detectors and potential degradation modes ( §3.3.1), anomalous operation during over-temperature conditions ( §3.3.2), and contingency planning for possible failure of EPHIN ( §3.3.3).
Detectors and potential permanent degradation
The EPHIN instrument 12 6-detector stack-3 ion-implanted Si detectors (A, B, and F) and 3 lithium-drifted Si [Si(Li)] detectors (C, D, and E)-plus a guard detector (G, a scintillator read by a photomultiplier tube, PMT). The EPHIN Input/Output (EIO) collects EPHIN data-including counts in a number of coincidence channels corresponding to various particle energy ranges-for inclusion in telemetry. Currently, the OBC RADMON process ( §1.2.2) watches 3 of 13 EPHIN coincidence channels-E1300, P4, and P41-that serve as Chandra's radiation monitor.
The EPHIN team expects that elevated temperatures may eventually degrade performance of the Si(Li) detectors through more rapid Li diffusion-directly from the higher temperature or indirectly through lowered bias voltage that might occur during episodes of reduced voltage that might occur during anomalous operation resulting from thermally induced leakage current ( §3.3.2). The symptom of this permanent degradation would be increased noise in the Si(Li) detectors (C, D, and E), which might render problematic the EPHIN channels using those detectors-i.e., the higher energy channels. However, there is no indication thus far of any permanent degradation. Furthermore, there are ways-e.g., adjusting RADMON trigger levels, averaging samples, or watching alternate EPHIN channels-to mitigate the adverse impact of increased Si(Li)-detector noise upon the radiation-protection program.
Anomalous EPHIN operation
A more immediate impact of elevated EPHIN temperatures is that thermally-induced increased leakage currents cause the +27V-rail supply to enter a current-limited state, resulting in reduced output voltage for temperatures >37°C. The reduced +27V-rail supply output voltage lowers the voltage of the high-voltage (HV) supplies, thus affecting the performance of some EPHIN detectors, as described below. To reverse this anomalous behavior requires allowing the detector temperatures to drop to <29°C, after which EPHIN again operates normally, with no permanent degradation. The +27V output drop effects a drop in the HV output to the (detector-G) PMT (Figure 7 left panel) , which lowers the efficiency of the G (guard) detector in serving as an anti-coincidence counter (Figure 7 right panel) . In turn, the inefficiency of detector G as an anti-coincidence counter results in excess noise in the other detectors. For 5 of the EPHIN channels-most notably the radiation-monitor channel E1300-this anomalous noise can be significant and even dominate the signal (Figure 8 right panel) . Indeed, during anomalous EPHIN operation, this excess E1300 noise can push the count rate over the RADMON threshold for triggering SCS107. Hence, the Chandra team doubled-from 10 to 20/(cm 2 s sr)-the RADMON threshold for E1300 on 2005 November 22.
While there is no telemetry for the output levels of the other HV power supplies, they presumably also drop during +27V-rail current-limited episodes. However, those voltage drops do not appear to impact their operation. Further, as long as the HV output is sufficient to maintain full-depletion of the Si(Li) detectors, permanent degradation (by diffusion) to these detectors should be slow. 
Contingency plans
One factor aiding the decision to allow routine operation of EPHIN in its anomalous state is the availability of the (focal-plane) HRC 6 as a radiation monitor. As described in Paper II 5 , OBC's RADMON process can use the HRC 6 anticoincidence-shield rate to flag times of high particle radiation. Indeed, prior to inclusion of the EPHIN as the Chandra radiation monitor, the HRC team had planned to use the HRC anti-co shield and MCP detector total event rates as radiation-monitor inputs. To facilitate potential use of the HRC as a radiation monitor, the flight operations team (FOT) on 2004 September 01 patched flight software to replace the 4 EPHIN helium channels with HRC channels in telemetry. If needed, the FOT will patch RADMON to substitute an HRC channel for one of the 3 watched EPHIN channels. Complete failure of EPHIN would require an additional patch so that RADMON ignores the EPHIN hardware failure. Figure 9 correlates the HRC anti-coincidence-shield rate with E1300 and EPHIN P41 fluxes, indicating that the anti-co rate is best matched to hard-proton rates. In principle, the data-handling ceiling at 248 ADU (analog-digital units) could adversely impact operations in that the HRC anti-co rate hits this ceiling before any EPHIN channel reaches its respective SCS107 threshold. However, an investigation of EPHIN-triggered SCS107 and instances for which the antico rate would have triggered SCS107 alleviates this concern. By design, EPHIN is a more versatile particle counter than the HRC anti-co shield and has a much larger dynamic range. Thus, we shall not activate HRC anti-coincidence monitoring within the RADMON process unless or until it becomes necessary. 
